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THE CONSTITUTION OF REASONS 
Robin L. West* 
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION. By Cass R. Sunstein. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 1993. Pp. vi, 414. Cloth, $35. 
Cass Sunstein's book, The Partial Constitution, 1 brings together a 
number of his constitutional law essays from the last ten years. Dur-
ing that time, Sunstein has argued, powerfully, for the unconstitution-
ality of regulatory constraints on access to abortion;2 for the 
constitutionality of and the need for regulation of violent pornogra-
phy;3 for the constitutionality of limits on both campaign spending 
and congressional control over public broadcasting;4 for the deep con-
sistency, conventional wisdom to the contrary notwithstanding, of the 
Court's repudiation of Lochner in 1937 with its 1974 decision in Roe v. 
Wade,· 5 for the view that we should accord far less deference than we 
do to presently held preferences and presently conceived "interests" in 
our public or collective decisionmaking;6 and for the view that at the 
heart of our constitutional traditions lies a commitment to deliberative 
democracy which, if sufficiently attended, could generate many more 
specific constitutional entailments, including but not limited to those 
put forth above. 7 This book re-presents, and by so doing strengthens, 
these arguments and a good number of others as well. Sunstein's now-
familiar arguments on all of these topics are detailed, nuanced, often 
unconventional, and sometimes courageous. They are also - and for 
the most part to their credit - of an entirely conventional form, put 
forward in lawyerly cadences and straightforward propositions, begin-
ning with general - but he thinks widely accepted - premises about 
the nature of our political life and proceeding through readings of the 
constitutional text and history toward specific conclusions about pres-
ent constitutional conundrums. This book is well worth reading and 
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1982, Stanford. - Ed. 
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rereading if for no other reason than to get a sense of the power of 
traditional legal arguments when put to often quite nontraditional 
political ends. 
Others have already produced a tremendous amount of secondary 
commentary on virtually all of these Sunsteinian arguments, and I am 
not going to catalogue or add to it here, in part for the familiar reason 
that I agree with many of his positions and I see no reason simply to 
add my assent. I want to comment instead on what I see as the addi-
tional task Sunstein has set out for himself in this book-a task which 
may be of greater significance than the correctness of any of the partic-
u1ar constitutional arguments the book elaborates. What Sunstein has 
tried to do in this book is to weave his arguments on particular issues 
into a coherent whole, largely by identifying and then developing the 
common philosophical premises of the various positions he has taken 
over the last ten years. He then argues that the conception of the Con-
stitution that emerges from a careful elaboration of those premises is 
both truer to our history and more just than the competing visions of 
the Constitution that both constitutional theorists and the Court have 
developed in the modern, post-New Deal era. 
Importantly, though, Sunstein does not simply present "his" inter-
pretation of the Constitution as one possible interpretation among any 
number. Rather, his starting premises, he clearly believes, are correct 
and widely held to be so. If that assumption is right, and if we share 
with him a commitment to rational forms of argument, then the Con-
stitution he envisions is not just "his" interpretation; instead, it is in an 
important sense "our" Constitution. It follows that the conclusions he 
reaches on substantive constitutional positions, including some he calls 
"surprising," shou1d command general assent. I think this larger, 
overarching project is not in the end successful, but I also think it is a 
tremendously worthy endeavor. It is a project full of promise and 
hope: the Constitution here envisioned is a just Constitution which 
cou1d indeed service the ends of justice in contemporary life. Conse-
quently, when the project fails, the failures are tremendously disap-
pointing, and the reasons for those failures important. 
In this review, I will first describe the deep structure of Sunstein's 
Constitution by outlining what I take to be the major premises elabo-
rated in his book and then criticizing sequentially each of the premises 
I take to be the basic building blocks of Sunstein's "partial Constitu-
tion." All of Sunstein's basic premises, I think, are more problematic 
than Sunstein believes them to be. By identifying the problems I hope 
to suggest that the flaws, although deep, are curable, and that whether 
or not that is the case, the constitutional goals Sunstein puts forward 
in this book are goals we shou1d applaud. 
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I. THE SUNSTEINIAN CONSTITUTION 
At least five philosophical premises - four substantive and one 
methodological - unify the various arguments that compose the core 
of this book. The first substantive premise regards the nature of the 
state, hence the nature and scope of state action, and ultimately, there-
fore, the reach of the Constitution. Sunstein takes it as given that the 
Constitution addresses only state, not private, action. It therefore be-
comes imperative to know what does or does not constitute state ac-
tion and what sorts of phenomena are accordingly within the reach of 
constitutional restraints. To answer that question, we need to know 
what is meant by the common notion of the state. As we all readily 
recognize, the state consists in part of legislatures and administrative 
agencies, and state action accordingly consists unproblematically of at 
least the decisions of those bodies. Central to virtually all of Sun-
stein's constitutional arguments, however, is the more contentious 
point that the state also consists of the seamless web of rules, stan-
dards, distinctions, and judgments that collectively constitute the com-
mon law (pp. 51-57, 74-75, 124, 159). 
Echoing Holmes and the realists, Sunstein repeatedly points out 
that this definition is simply a matter of brute "fact," and even of obvi-
ous brute fact (pp. 51, 40-67), but he finds it nevertheless to be a fact 
of tremendous consequence, and a fact often ignored. Once we recog-
nize that the state consists of the common law of property, contract, 
and tort, as well as the enactments of legislatures, the much treasured 
distinctions - treasured, that is, by some conventional liberals, many 
conservatives, and all libertarians - between public and private law 
(p. 159), between action and inaction (pp. 71-75), between partisan 
and neutral (pp. 75-80), between state and individual (pp. 90-91), and 
between positive and negative rights (pp. 69-71) virtually disappear. 
Private markets, to take an important example, do not exemplify, con-
stitute, or participate in a private sphere of life unpolluted by state 
intervention: rather, the existence of a market is itself entirely a crea-
tion of the state, and more particularly a creation of the state common 
law of tort, contract, and property. Without contract and property 
law - and hence without the state - markets would not exist (p. 50). 
For similar sorts of reasons, when a legislature fails to act - fails to 
protect a citizen against violence, discrimination, or pollution - we 
cannot sensibly describe that as mere "inaction" in the face of a prele-
gal status quo and hence outside the reach of constitutional norms. 
Rather, the status quo the legislature failed to change is itself a prod-
uct of legally created - hence state-created - rights and obligations 
(pp. 71-75). 
That the purportedly private market and the purportedly prelegal 
status quo, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, are actually 
products of state action is a brute fact that, if fully understood, renders 
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utterly fallacious a good bit of contemporary as well as pre-New Deal 
constitutional law, in addition to a great deal of contemporary 
libertarian rhetoric about the virtues of private markets as contrasted 
with the silliness, corruption, ineptitude, or incompetence of state in-
tervenors. The state, Sunstein reminds us forcefully, is always already 
present in these supposedly private markets, no less than the state was 
present in the racially segregated private culture of the Plessy-era 
South (pp. 42-45). In fact, there is no meaningful realm of purely 
private life, if by private life we mean life untouched by state action, so 
we ought to quit thinking in terms of false dichotomies that assume 
the existence of unicorns. There is no private world of private action 
that exists apart from the mechanisms of the state, Sunstein strongly 
suggests (pp. 159-61). There is private action, to be sure, and such 
private action is indeed not the target of the Constitution (pp. 159-61). 
But that private action is invariably and inevitably facilitated by, 
structured by, permitted by, made possible by - no less than con-
strained by - the actions of states. Those actions, Sunstein insists, 
should without question be regarded, although they often are not, as 
the proper target of the Constitution (pp. 159-61). 
Second, Sunstein argues, a great deal of contemporary constitu-
tional law and contemporary constitutional argument rests on the 
flawed assumption that the requirement of "government neutrality" 
properly found in the Constitution mandates that the government take 
a deferential attitude toward the status quo, whenever that status quo 
is a product of either nature, market choices, or prelegal social struc-
tures (pp. v-vi, 1-14, 68-92). In other words, it is widely believed that 
the Constitution requires governmental neutrality, and what that neu-
trality requires in tum is that the government not "take sides" in so-
cial, natural, or market struggles. Sunstein endorses the premise but 
vigorously protests the inference. It is entirely correct, Sunstein insists 
- indeed, it is one of the major themes of his book - that govern-
ment should live up to an ideal of neutrality, if by neutrality we mean 
that legislation must be backed by public-regarding reasons (p. 17). 
However, it does not follow from that premise that government should 
be neutral toward things as they are, a claim that Sunstein calls, as a 
shorthand, "status quo neutrality" (pp. 68-92). Rather, the Constitu-
tion - for the most part - requires and should require precisely the 
opposite. The central point of the Constitution, for Sunstein, is that 
government should be most decidedly neutral, which in tum requires 
questioning, not a deferential stance toward, "things as they are" (pp. 
4-7, 123-61, 347-54). 
Two important consequences follow. First, once we see that this is 
the core meaning of the Constitution, we will also see that much of 
what we have come to believe is unconstitutional - such as regula-
tions of pornography (pp. 261-70), limits on campaign spending (pp. 
223-24), prohibitions on some forms of hate speech (pp. 245-53), or 
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broadcasting (pp. 213-33)- may in fact be not only constitutionally 
permissible but in some ways constitutionally obligatory. Rather than 
being inappropriate intrusions into the prelegal, natural, or simply 
given status quo, as they might on first blush appear to be, these state 
actions are better seen as legislated corrections of a status quo that is 
itself state created and manifestly unjust. Because the Constitution in 
a sense demands of us an ever-vigilant stance toward the possibility 
that the status quo is unjust, these correctives should be constitution-
ally applauded, not constitutionally suspect. It is this argument, and 
the handful of conclusions to which it leads regarding the meaning 
and scope of the First Amendment, that Sunstein has provocatively 
labeled a "New Deal" for speech (pp. 197-231). 
The second implication is simply the other side of the coin: we will 
also see that much of what we had thought to be constitutional is in 
fact unconstitutional. Any number of bits and pieces of the common 
law of trespass, contract, and property - when viewed, as they should 
be, as state action, and when scrutinized, as they should be, for con-
formity or nonconformity with the mandates of justice - may be re-
vealed as unconstitutional, particularly if they are themselves nothing 
more than encrusted codifications of an unjust status quo. Laws per-
mitting private owners of public spaces, such as shopping centers, or 
of television licenses or of newspapers to use their property in a way 
that effectively shuts down means for public debate and dialogue, for 
example, even if facially neutral, should accordingly be examined 
against a demanding constitutional test: If the laws burden delibera-
tion and stem from background entitlements that are themselves un-
just, they may be properly subject to constitutional challenge (pp. 224-
26). 
These two inferences obviously point in opposite directions. The 
first suggests a more modest, less intrusive Constitution - the First 
Amendment does not reach as much legislation regulating speech as 
commonly believed, just as, analogously, the Contract, Takings, and 
Due Process Clauses do not reach as much legislation regulating eco-
nomic behavior as commonly believed during the Lochner era. The 
second suggests a more ambitious constitutional role - once the com-
mon law, as well as conventional sorts of state action, is regarded as 
the proper target of the Constitution, a great deal of private conduct 
once thought beyond the reach of the Constitution becomes a lens that 
might magnify the constitutional infirmities of the common law. 
There is clearly no inconsistency, however, between these two infer-
ences. Both inferences - the lesser intrusiveness of the First Amend-
ment against legislation regulating speech, and the greater role of 
other clauses, notably the Equal Protection Clause, when used as 
swords against the common law - are sensibly drawn from the same 
premise. The central point is simply that the Constitution exists and 
should exist to prod us toward a reexamination, not a reaffirmation, of 
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extant entitlements and distributions. This obviously suggests both a 
judicial deference toward legislative efforts to correct for present injus-
tices, which is the Sunsteinian reading of the central message of West 
Coast Hotel, 8 and a constitutionally inspired critical attack on extant 
injustice, sometimes emanating from the judiciary but more frequently 
and more appropriately from the legislature. 
Third, Sunstein argues, we should engage deliberative democracy 
as well as constitutional argument in the tribunal of reason (pp. 17-39). 
Only reasons, Sunstein insists - not appeals to authority, not appeals 
to nature, not "naked preferences," not self-interest, and above all else 
not unadorned grasps for power - should guide collective choice. We 
should not understand democracy as a forum in which competing in-
terests vie for votes, dollars, or influence (pp. 24-27). Rather, democ-
racy requires above all else that collective decisions be justified by 
public-regarding reasons (pp. 17-24). It is not enough that a law com-
mand the consent of a majority of the governed, or that a compromise 
command the begrudging consent of warring factions, or that a bill 
accurately reflect the victor in a contested battle for legislative power. 
Law generally, and every law in particular, should be and constitu-
tionally must be in the interest of the community, and arguments for or 
against a proposed legal reform must be grounded in nothing but rea-
soned appeals to the interest of the community. Factional interests, 
preferences, power, authority, and nature all fail to justify decisions 
made by some that will affect all. Only reasons can justify such collec-
tive decisions. 
The fourth Sunsteinian premise is a principle of justice. Sunstein 
puts forward in this book an elaboration of suggestions he has made 
elsewhere regarding a particular conception of the meaning of equal-
ity, and hence of the Equal Protection Clause.9 The equality to which 
we are as a people committed, Sunstein insists, at least since the Re-
construction era - the equality that accordingly finds expression in 
the Fourteenth Amendment - is the equality embodied in what he 
calls in shorthand an "anticaste principle" (pp. 338-45). The anticaste 
principle requires neither substantive egalitarianism, as argued by the 
Left, nor a bare formal equality, as argued by the Right, but some-
thing quite different from both. What the Fourteenth Amendment de-
mands of states, and what equality demands of society, is that they not 
turn a morally irrelevant characteristic into the basis for systemic dis-
advantage (p. 339). Thus, to take the obvious example, the state can-
not systematically disadvantage blacks on the basis of the morally 
irrelevant characteristic of race. Affirmative action, however, raises 
no constitutional problem - proponents of affirmative action, believes 
8. Pp. 45-51 (discussing West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)). 
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Compensatory Justice, in NOMOS XXXIII: COMPEN-
SATORY JUSTICE 281, 303-07 (John w. Chapman ed., 1991). 
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Sunstein, do not intend systematically to disadvantage whites on the 
basis of their race. {pp. 343-45). In the same way, prohibitions on 
access to abortion violate the anticaste principle because they have the 
effect of subjecting women to systemic disadvantage solely on the basis 
of a morally irrelevant characteristic - the ability to carry a fetus {pp. 
272-85). Thus Roe, Sunstein argues, follows in direct lineage, not 
from the discredited substantive due process reasoning of the Lochner 
era, but rather from the equal protection jurisprudential underpin-
nings of Brown. 10 Both decisions preclude the state from participating 
in the creation or maintenance of a two-tier system of citizenship. 
These are powerful premises, and they collectively form the skele-
ton of a Constitution that is markedly different from that projected by 
the major liberal theorists of the 1960s and 1970s, the critical scholars 
of the 1970s and 1980s, and the major conservative theorists of the 
1980s and 1990s. Let me mention just a few of the prominent differ-
ences. The Sunsteinian Constitution, unlike that of both the liberals 
and the conservatives, is largely aimed at legislatures and citizens 
rather than judges; Sunstein cleanly separates institutional imperatives 
that constrain judges from constitutional mandates, leaving room to 
argue for a large number of constitutionally obligatory measures that 
only legislatures, rather than courts, could institute. Second, the Sun-
steinian Constitution, although_ not directed against private action, is 
often, perhaps routinely, triggered by private action, again unlike the 
Constitution propounded by both liberal and conservative theorists. 
The private actions facilitated by the common law, although not the 
target, are what generate the .challenges to the constitutionality of 
those background common law norms. Third, the Sunsteinian Consti-
tution is considerably more activist than that promoted by liberals in 
some areas, but considerably more modest in others. This is simply 
because the central target of the Constitution is not the occasionally 
unjust legislative act but an unjust status quo. This target may in turn 
be reflected in a piece of unconstitutional legislation, as envisioned by 
the paradigm liberal Constitution, or in either an unjust common law 
or a state's unjust reticence to use its powers to correct an unjust social 
reality. Consequently, Sunstein would be willing to exert constitu-
tional pressure when liberals often would not - for example, to invali-
date some property law when it is used in a way that frustrates public 
debate and dialogue - but" less likely to see constitutional violations 
when liberals often do - whenever a legislature is· acting against an 
unjust status quo and the liberals' finding of unconstitutionality is 
premised explicitly or implicitly. on an assumption that the prelegal 
status quo is natural or private and therefore just, as with pornography 
legislation. Fourth - and this may be the key insight of this book -
10. Pp. 260, 270-85 (comparing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
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in clear contrast to the Constitution propounded by modem conserva-
tives, the Sunsteinian Constitution demands an almost relentless reex-
amination, not a preservation, of extant institutions, traditions, and 
distributions. In fact, what the Constitution is, Sunstein insists, is a 
precommitment strategy toward precisely that reexamination. 
The fifth major premise of this book is methodological: in contrast 
to that of the critical legal studies (CLS) scholars, the Sunsteinian 
Constitution is relatively determinate. Sunstein's commitment to the 
determinacy of the Constitution, furthermore, is stunningly revealed 
in the tone, style, and rhetoric of this book, as much as by its substan-
tive argument. Sunstein does argue explicitly, in the chapters devoted 
to issues of interpretation, for the determinacy that has now become a 
staple of anti-CLS argument: that constitutional law is not a matter of 
politics; that determinate answers to constitutional questions are possi-
ble; that there are right and wrong answers to constitutional questions; 
and that history gives some but not complete guidance for the familiar 
list of reasons (pp. 93-122). All of this will strike some readers as 
comfortingly familiar - it is the same stance that virtually all of the 
important non-CLS constitutional theorists of the past thirty years 
have taken, regardless of their substantive positions - and will strike 
others for that very reason as simply quaint. 
Far more revealing than the explicit case it makes for determinacy, 
I think, is the tone of this book. Sunstein is absolutely sure, not to put 
too fine a point on it, that he is right. This confidence carries him 
through not only discussion of his philosophical premises but further 
through his arguments about the constitutionality of pornography leg-
islation, the unconstitutionality of prohibitions on abortion, and so on. 
When he is not sure of his conclusions, he is careful to say so. His 
occasional tentativeness, though, comes not from any insecurity on his 
part but rather from the lack of decisive evidence. For the most part, 
Sunstein argues on the clear assumption that the conclusions he 
reaches about our modem constitutional debates follow logically from 
the handful of political and moral premises summarized above about 
the nature of the state, the essential historical and textual meaning of 
the Constitution, the noncontroversial content of substantive princi-
ples of justice, and, above all else, the primacy of reason in collective 
and constitutional judgment. 
The implication of the rhetoric of certainty is manifestly clear on 
every page of this book. The rhetoric suggests that reason should 
guide us toward consensus on both political and constitutional issues. 
Thus, if we accept these tremendously attractive philosophical prem-
ises about the requirements of justice - accept what sound like incon-
trovertible claims about the nature of the state, agree with the 
plausibility of his account of the core meaning of the Constitution, and 
above all else accept his insistence that public decisions be reasoned -
then, if we are being intellectually honest, we should all, whether we 
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are prochoice or prolife, agree with his endorsement of the outcome in 
Roe; whether we are libertarian or communitarian, we should agree 
with his analysis of the constitutionality of congressional control of 
broadcasting; whether we are enthusiastic or skeptical of the liberatory 
powers of private speech and private culture generally, we will see the 
constitutionality of attempts to regulate pornography; whether we are 
committed to or repelled by race-conscious attempts to eradicate the 
legacy of slavery, we will concur that affirmative action is constitution-
ally permitted. The deep claim of this book, in other words, which it 
tries to exemplify as well as to put forward, is simply that reasoned 
discussion of precisely the sort in the book itself is what will lead to 
agreement. Sunstein explicitly argues that reason - not tradition, not 
nature, not authority, not past state decisions - is what should guide 
collective choice (pp. 17-20). He tries to exemplify the closely related 
point that reason - not passion, emotion, sentiment, or politics -
should guide individual as well as collective thought and will guide it 
toward agreement. · 
I hope that the brief discussion above captures the central argu-
ments and spirit of this powerful book. Let me state unequivocally 
that this is good constitutional writing. Much of this book is convinc-
ing; all of it is well argued. Each of the premises on which these argu-
ments rest, however, has problems. In the remainder of this review, I 
will comment very briefly on some of the problems posed by each of 
the first four major premises outlined above. In the conclusion I will 
comment briefly and impressionistically on what I take to be the im-
plicit methodological theme, exemplified as well as argued in Sun-
stein's writing: that this is a republic of reasons and that what that 
means is that our moral, political, and constitutional deliberation must 
be, above all else, reasoned. I do not think it is possible, nor do I think 
it desirable, to equate moral - and hence political, legal, or constitu-
tional - argument with the exercise of reason. The shortcomings of 
this masterful book by an accomplished constitutional scholar quite 
vividly illustrate why. 
II. A CRmCAL AssESSMENT 
A. The Ever-present State 
As noted above in Part I, at the heart of the Sunsteinian Constitu-
tion is the insight - borrowed lock, stock, and barrel from the legal 
realists - that "the state" is pretty much everywhere (pp. 68-75). Ac-
cording to Sunstein, when a private homeowner covenants not to sell 
his home to a black buyer, it is by virtue of the common law of con-
tract and property that he is able to do so (pp. 56-57). The home-
owner's promise may be private - indeed it is - but the mechanisms 
by which that promise is enforceable, and hence meaningful, are state 
mechanisms, and the norms to be enforced are the familiar state-gen-
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erated norms of property and contract law. When the owner of a 
shopping center excludes political speech from the premises, the deci-
sion to do so is a private one, but the threat of forcible removal is 
made possible only by virtue of the state, its law of trespass, and its 
mechanisms for delegating and enforcing those norms (p. 160). Every 
private action, every private entitlement, every private act of exclusion 
is facilitated by the state. That facilitation is action - it is action of 
the state- and hence is properly subject to constitutional scrutiny. If 
it violates a constitutional norm - which, of course, it may not - it 
should be struck down. Sunstein's analysis thus retains the "state-ac-
tion" doctrine, but it diminishes the doctrine's force significantly. The 
Constitution is indeed directed only at the actions of the state, but the 
state is acting in virtually every private transaction one can conceiva-
bly imagine. 
Sunstein draws two inferences from this premise, one that suggests 
a less intrusive Constitution and one that suggests a more intrusive 
Constitution. The first inference is that, contrary to the claims of 
some right-wing libertarian constitutional theorists, when a legislature 
acts to redistribute existing property rights, that legislature is not in-
truding into a private sphere because the existing property rights are 
themselves a function of state action (pp. 51-62). Accordingly, we 
should not regard that legislative intrusion itself as an impermissible 
invasion of the private sphere and therefore unconstitutional under the 
Takings, Contract, or Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. It 
may, of course, be unconstitutional for some other reason. But the 
argument for its unconstitutionality cannot possibly draw any rhetori-
cal or legal strength from the fallacious claim that the state has in-
vaded a private realm of private conduct and that, by virtue of that 
fact, the invasion is somehow impermissible. 
Sunstein's second inference is that those pieces of common law 
that facilitate private action may themselves be constitutionally sus-
pect if they violate a constitutional prohibition - if, for example, they 
render deliberative democracy impossible (pp. 197-256) or they violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment's embrace of the anticaste principle (pp. 
338-46). Thus, the law of defamation may violate the First Amend-
ment - indeed, the Court so held in New York Times v. Sullivan. 11 
The exercise of property rights created by the common law may vio-
late the First Amendment as well (pp. 206-13). Contract law and 
property law combined may violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
under certain circumstances. Sunstein's conclusion, then, is that we 
should regard such bits and pieces of the common law as fair game for 
constitutional scrutiny, and, if they are constitutionally offensive, we 
should strike them down. 
The suggestion is appealing, and the motivation for it clear 
11. See pp. 203-10 (discussing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
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enough. Sunstein wants to retain the state-action doctrine - he de-
clares repeatedly his enthusiastic endorsement of it (pp. 159-61, 204-
05) - but, at the same time, he wants to bring within the ambit of 
constitutional scrutiny the multiple ways in which the less visible ac-
tions of the state are complicit in a huge array of injuries, which on 
first blush appear to be inflicted by private actors in the private sphere. 
To put it bluntly, there is indeed a state-action doctrine - the Consti-
tution addresses only state, not private action - but the requirement 
that there be state action is almost always met. Again, the state is in 
some sense always already present. The real issue for Sunstein is sub-
stantive: whether or not the state action in question - which may be 
only the state's willingness to enforce a trespass cause of action or to 
enforce an executory contract - violates the Constitution. It may 
not, but then again, it just might. 
There is much to be said for this reorientation of the state-action 
requirement, but there are also problems, of which I want to mention 
two. The first is at once practical, legal, and strategic. The sorts of 
background common law rules Sunstein bas in mind - the law of 
trespass, primarily, but also of contract and property more generally 
conceived - are almost always unobjectionable and neutral when 
looked at outside the context of unjust and hugely disproportionate 
amassments of private power. It is not clear, in light of that fact, what 
the relative gain of the Sunsteinian approach is over a more radical 
approach that argues more directly that the grotesquely disproportion-
ate distribution of private power is precisely the trigger of the Consti-
tution. For instance, it is by virtue of the private law of property that 
I am entitled to keep bigots, misogynists, and Seventh Day Adventists 
out of my house, and I assume that the law of property does not for 
that reason violate the First Amendment. When the shopping center 
owner invokes the same property right, however, the First Amend-
ment may well be implicated. Surely the constitutional problem, then, 
is the shopping center's amassment of private power and the impact of 
that power on public debate. It seems artificial in the extreme to say 
that the constitutional problem in the latter case is the state's law of 
trespass, when applied to shopping center owners, but that seems to be 
precisely the analysis Sunstein advocates. 
To take another example not so fully raked over in cases and com-
mentaries but of perhaps greater import: there seems to be solid evi-
dence to support the claim that private racism and sexism permeate· 
private markets for rentals and sales of cars.12 Women and blacks pay 
more for cars than do white men. Surely this ongoing practice violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment's anticaste principle: it is hard to imagine 
a clearer example of a social practice that turns a morally irrelevant 
12. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991). 
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distinction into a systemic disadvantage. Surely contract and property 
law facilitate this private action; the state is implicated in the same 
way as it is implicated in the shopping center owner's apparent denial 
of important First Amendment guarantees of public discourse. It 
seems perverse, however, to characterize the root problem in this situa-
tion as a problem that adheres in contract and property law. The root 
problem here is private racism and sexism, pure and simple. There is 
indeed a hard question as to whether we can or should reconceptualize 
the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment to bring the problems of 
private racism or sexism into its ambit of concerns - I think we can, 
and I have elaborated the argument elsewhere.13 Maybe my argument 
is wrong, and the Constitution simply cannot be sensibly read as hav-
ing anything to do with private conduct of this sort. But I am not sure 
it is going to be very helpful to bring this kind of problem within the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment by recharacterizing it as a prob-
lem of state mendacity, stemming from the state's authorship of con-
tract and property law, rather than as individual, societal, and cultural 
misconduct. 
The second and larger problem, which the strategic issue above 
really only reflects, is philosophical. Sunstein's insistence on the per-
meation of private life with state action comes close to being a denial 
of the very existence of private culture. There are a number of ways to 
put this point. Perhaps the most direct is to suggest a point of meta-
phorical contrast between Sunstein and traditional liberal and commu-
nitarian social theorists. Liberal theorists, almost by definition, 
conceive of the individual as prior to society in some sense; com-
munitarians, in contrast, conceive of the community as prior to the 
individual in some sense. Sunstein, notably, and in contrast to both, 
seems to conceive of the state as prior to both individual and commu-
nity. For Sunstein, the state really is everywhere, always and already. 
It was in the cultural segregation of the pre-Brown south (pp. 42-45). 
It was in the pre-New Deal contractual relationships between employ-
ers and nonunionized, exploited, overworked, and underpaid workers 
(pp. 45-54). It is in the homeowner's decision to oust the Seventh Day 
Adventist from the doorstep (p. 209). It is in the seller's decision to 
sell to whites only (pp. 56-57), and it is in the pornographer's decision 
to depict violent sexuality (pp. 261-70). The state is operating, 
whether we see it or not, anywhere and everywhere. It is prior to 
individual and community alike. It is not constitutive of both, but, 
rather, it constitutes both. 
This is a deep distinction, in some ways too deep to be visible, and 
I am afraid that its invisibility skews Sunstein's understanding of his 
adversaries. Surely when libertarians and liberals speak of the prop-
13. Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. 
VA. L. REV. 111 (1991). 
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erty rights of individuals as being naturally "theirs," and in that sense 
prior to the state, they are speaking metaphorically. Sunstein writes as 
though this were not the case, and, to that degree, I fear he is attack-
ing a strawperson. All of us, surely including libertarians, know that 
my property is mine by virtue of laws created by states. What the 
libertarian means by insisting on their naturalness is that the state is 
enforcing something that, given the nature of human beings, the indi-
vidual should have dominion over. The property is "naturally" the 
individual's in the sense only that the individual is naturally such that 
his property - in this or that - should be recognized. The claim of 
naturalness, in other words, is a relatively easily translated normative 
claim based on what people are like. No one thinks property rights 
are literally prelegal. 
Sunstein simply does not come to grips with this interpretation of 
the libertarian's claim, and the reason he does not, I think, is that he is 
taken by an equally powerful and equally blinding metaphor: the met-
aphorical creation by the prior state of all individuals, as opposed to 
the metaphorical creation, beloved by libertarians, of states by prior 
individuals. For Sunstein, it is impossible to conceive of individual 
private action unadorned or unaffected by the state, purely and simply, 
because it is impossible to conceive of individuals independent of the 
state. It is, consequently, impossible to conceive of what individual 
"nature" would be like, prior to or independent of the state. This is a 
powerful metaphor, with powerful consequences for constitutional 
analysis, particularly for a Constitution with a state-action require-
ment at its heart. But it is nevertheless an unfortunate one. 
It is an unfortunate metaphor primarily because its description of 
our natures is simply wrong. There are indeed private individuals, pri-
vate acts and actors. There are, in other words, private cultures, and 
the most profound implication from that fact is that we cannot accu-
rately describe our individual and communitarian nature as fully con-
stituted by the state. I do not mean by this claim that there exist 
private cultures that are unaffected by law - of course these do not 
exist. There are, however, "private cultures" in this different and im-
portant sense: there are associations of persons that are private - in 
that they consist of individuals coming together with the very con-
scious aim and desire to divorce their community from the influences 
and requirements of the state - and that are cultural - in that they 
come together in order to exert an influence, through the media of 
ritual, tradition, language, and any number of other forces, over the 
identity and self-understanding of their members. 
These private cultures are everywhere. Let me name just a few to 
give a flavor of the phenomenon I want to highlight. College fraterni-
ties, for example, are profoundly cultural and emphatically private. 
For that matter, the entire sports culture is private and cultural in the 
sense mentioned above: it exerts a tremendous influence on the iden-
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tity of participants, and it is private; it is exclusionary and 
nondemocratic toward nonparticipants. Not everyone can play. In 
the marketplace, which of course is facilitated by state law, a private 
culture of toy manufacturers and toy consumers has generated a sepa-
rate cultural realm in which sex-role stereotyping - of dolls, toy cos-
metics, and toy soldiers - runs rampant; step into a Toys-R-Us and 
you will see the tremendous power of private culture to perpetuate 
sex-role stereotyping. To take a historical example, the city of Buffalo, 
New York apparently harbored during the 1930s and 1940s a thriving 
bar subculture of working-class lesbians, sharply divided into butch 
and fem. 14 The Amish of Ohio and Pennsylvania and the Mormon 
communities in Utah and Nevada have developed sharply delineated 
private cultures. There is, to take an example closer to one of Sun-
stein's central concerns, a private subculture of contemporary sexual 
radicals, whose members get as much sustenance from their sexual 
radicalism as Cass Sunstein gets from the U.S. Constitution. That 
subculture produces a large number of publications, all of which are 
profoundly threatened by antipomography legislation of the sort Sun-
stein has gone to considerable lengths to defend. There are private 
schools that generate their own culture, and parents who educate their 
children at home. There still exist some communes that date from the 
"countercultural" movements in the 1960s, the privacy and culture of 
which have been made tremendously resilient over the past thirty 
years. Obviously, one could go on and on. 
Again, I am not claiming that these groups are not in some way 
facilitated by permissive state action; of course they are. It is, though, 
an almost ludicrous misdescription of their natures to describe them as 
the end product of state action - the state action is the tail wagging 
the dog. These groups exemplify a human impulse to resist the state 
- in many cases, to resist precisely the participatory democratic dia-
logue Sunstein and other civic republicans so clearly cherish. The de-
nial that they exist - and more specifically, the denial that they exist 
as essentially private cultures - has, I think, at least two pernicious 
side effects. 
First, it leads to a sort of inattentiveness to the occasional virtues, 
but more often the deathly vices, of these private cultures. These com-
munities, or cultures, all exist, almost by definition, to foster a self-
identity that stands in contrast to the state-created, participating citi-
zen at the heart of the Sunsteinian democratic soul. Those identities 
might have virtues worth attending to; they might open up different 
possibilities for exemplary lives, in ways familiar to any Mill devotee 
- and Sunstein is surely one. However, they also may and often do 
foster identities that are profoundly destructive. The sports culture is 
14. ELIZABETH L. KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF 
GOLD (1993). 
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violent, misogynistic, and competitive; the Amish and Mormon com-
munities are both depressingly authoritarian and thoroughly racist 
and sexist; private schooling is antidemocratic in the very sphere -
education - in which democratic ideals seem to matter most; the 
coqntercultural communes, even the nonauthoritarian ones of which 
there are precious few, cut off individual education and development 
in ways that seem unconscionable. When we deny the distinctiveness 
of these private cultures and the quite separate identities to which they 
give rise by seeing them as simply further fiowerings of an ever-crea-
tive, albeit sometimes invisible, "state," we have in effect sanitized as 
well as homogenized social life, and by doing so we preclude an impor-
tant area of critical inquiry. · 
Second, by denying in effect the privateness of these private cul-
tures, we have denied - or cut off - the possible relevance of the 
Constitution to the quite distinctive identities these communities gen-
erate. Again, I am most emphatically not saying that, for Sunstein, 
these private cultures are beyond the reach of the Constitution because 
they are private. Rather, for Sunstein, all of the private cultures listed 
above may raise constitutional problems, but, if they do, they do so 
because of the underlying common law of tort, contract, or property that 
facilitates or permits their existence. What is denied by this argument 
is the quite different possibility that the cultures themselves and the 
identities they generate might by virtue of their private nature give rise 
to problems of a constitutional dimension. The systematic denial to 
Mormon women and girls of positions. of power in the church and of 
access to education might, for example, constitute a denial of the equal 
protection of the law, not because of any problem with contract or 
tort, but because of the gross inequalities built into the Mormon reli-
gion. The analogy here is to slavery itself: the identity created by the 
slave society - of course facilitated by law, but centrally a product of 
that private society of master and slave - is an unconstitutional iden-
tity, an unconstitutional relationship, an unconstitutional "society" 
under both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. If the anal-
ogy is sound, then in the case of the Amish or Mormon culture, as in 
the case of slave culture, it is because of their distinctiveness - their 
distinctive authoritarian and sexist and racist structures - that consti-
tutional concerns are triggered. Whether the denial of equal protec-
tion to women within the Mormon community is sufficiently serious to 
outweigh the group's right to an autonomous existence is, to my mind, 
the underlying constitutional and moral problem that the existence of 
groups of this sort raises. However we resolve that question, we 
should be clear, I think, that what is being proposed is the possible 
unconstitutionality of a private culture's actions by virtue of the distin-
guishing features of that culture. It is that possibility that Sunstein's 
analysis forecloses, and I think unfortunately so. 
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B. Status Quo Neutrality 
Sunstein's second philosophical premise is that, while governmen-
tal neutrality is an unqualified good, governmental neutrality toward 
the status quo is almost always - but not always - a mistake. Sun-
stein sometimes calls this phenomenon "status quo neutrality" (pp. 3-
7), and he states repeatedly throughout the book, and at length in his 
introduction and conclusion, that status quo neutrality is his central 
target: it has - almost - no legitimate place in government 
processes (pp. 3-7, 347-54). True neutrality - the good kind - re-
quires not complacent acquiescence in the status quo but a critical 
attitude toward it. According to Sunstein, we are a republic of rea-
sons, and what such a republic must do is justify its actions. Acquies-
cence in the status quo is one such action. It does not justify itself. 
The evenhandedness in simply "keeping things as they are" is only 
apparent, not real; just as the blatantly redistributive legislative act 
takes from A to give to B, so the state that stays its hand actively 
perpetuates the preexisting distributions enjoyed by A and B, distribu-
tions which are themselves, importantly, a product of state action. 
As a constitutional matter, the position of status quo neutrality is a 
bit more complex. There are, Sunstein concedes, a number of consti-
tutional phrases that both seem to, and in fact do, mandate acquies-
cence in the status quo: the Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause 
rather strongly suggest that to some degree we are supposed to hold 
existing property entitlements inviolable (pp. 91-92, 156). At the other 
extreme, a few constitutional principles seem to mandate an aggres-
sive, critical stance toward the status quo: the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause is the clearest example (pp. 154, 156-
58). Generally, though, the Constitution consists of substantive prin-
ciples that do not in any simple way counsel for or against the status 
quo. Sunstein's prescription for political deliberation vis-a-vis the 
Constitution, then, runs something like this: typically, the Constitu-
tion permits, but does not mandate or preclude, a critical stance to-
ward the status quo. In those vast areas of public deliberation, then, 
political morality dictates what we should do: we should correct the 
status quo through legislation when we find it to be unjust. Impor-
tantly, the Constitution for the most part does not preclude us from so 
doing. In some areas of life, however, we have a constitutional as well 
as moral and political obligation to adopt such a critical stance: the 
areas of life touched on by the Fourteenth Amendment are the clearest 
cases. In other areas of life, too, we have a constitutional mandate to 
refrain from doing what we should otherwise do: when such a reex-
amination would so interfere with existing property entitlements that 
it would violate the Contract, Takings, or Substantive Due Process 
Clause. Conflicts between those areas where status quo neutrality is 
mandated and those in which status quo neutrality is made the explicit 
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target of constitutional analysis give rise, unsurprisingly, to the hard 
cases of constitutional law. When there is no such conflict, however 
- and there is no such conflict in far more cases than is typically 
argued by both libertarians and liberals - the cases are easy and 
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of redistributive, 
corrective legislation. 
There are two problems in Sunstein's analysis, one that stems from 
a progressive perspective and another from a conservative one. The 
first problem is that, for all the attention Sunstein gives to the problem 
of status quo neutrality, both in the law and in politics, he is in the end 
surprisingly ambivalent toward it. Status quo neutrality is only some-
times morally unacceptable to Sunstein. It turns out to be fully ac-
ceptable to Sunstein when the security of market capitalism demands 
it (pp. 128-29, 341-42). When the workings of markets occasion the 
injustice of the status quo, the importance of maintaining those mar-
kets in effect trumps whatever justice-based concerns might have 
prompted a critical attack. Although we should generally be critical 
of and not biased toward the status quo, precisely the opposite pre-
sumption arises in Sunstein's analysis when the status quo consists of 
inequalities of wealth - even quite large inequalities of wealth - oc-
casioned by market capitalism. Sunstein suggests that both the Con-
stitution and political morality require not just complacency toward 
but approval of those inequalities (pp. 341-42). 
The confusion resulting from this analysis has at its heart a glaring 
inconsistency, which is, to Sunstein's credit, frequently, even obses-
sively, noted - like the elephant in the china closet, one must some-
how attend to it - but is never adequately resolved. Status quo 
neutrality is bad - but not always bad. It is bad, in short, unless the 
security of markets demands it. Then it is good. We should always be 
critical of existing distributions - unless those existing distributions 
are a product of markets, in which case, sometimes, we should not be 
so critical (pp. 128-29). We should be vigilantly on our guard against 
injustices caused by the day-to-day invisible actions of states, including 
the relatively invisible operations of the common law, unless such vigi-
lance will raise doubts about distributions of wealth, in which case the 
overriding liberatory virtues of markets and market behavior might -
but might not - outweigh the injustices those markets could effectu-
ate (pp. 128-29, 137-38, 341-42). The result is unprincipled in the ex-
treme. Nowhere does Sunstein put forward anything more than 
empty slogans exalting the liberatory virtues of markets in defense of 
this deference to market capitalism. Nowhere does he defend this pro-
foundly bia5ed stance in favor of the market-generated status quo in a 
book overwhelmingly devoted to a critical attack on the very attitude 
of bias that the book's own stance toward market inequalities 
exemplifies. 
The effect of Sunstein's highly qualified attack on the status quo, of 
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course, is to blunt the impact of what is otherwise a strikingly radical 
suggestion - to wit, that we must justify the status quo. Surely, to 
many minds, the most strikingly unjust aspect of the modem status 
quo is the profound inequalities of wealth to which market economies, 
particularly over the past fifteen years, have led. Surely the most com-
pelling, interesting, innovative, and, indeed, hopeful implication one 
might want to draw from an account of the Constitution - an ac-
count that puts at its core an expansive understanding of the state-
action requirement and then couples that reading with a moral and 
political philosophical insistence that the status quo be justified - is 
that the grotesque maldistributions of this country's wealth are consti-
tutionally suspect. It is surely one of the great disappointments of this 
book that Sunstein reaches precisely the opposite conclusion. Even 
given his expansive understanding of state action, even given the 
book's core thesis that status quo neutrality is usually intolerable, the 
conclusion reached, with only the slightest equivocation and hand 
wringing, is that not only are even extreme maldistributions of wealth 
constitutionally permitted but they should apparently be constitution-
ally protected (pp. 128-29). Inequalities between the sexes, between 
the races, between the handicapped and the able bodied, are all a part 
of a status quo that likely leads to impermissible castes, and that is 
constitutionally fatal. Inequalities of wealth, however, are beyond the 
reach of the Constitution and, in a sense, even beyond the reach of 
moral inquiry. They are a product of market capitalism, itself condu-
cive to liberty, productivity, and a healthy respect for differences. Ac-
cording to Sunstein, those inequalities - that aspect of the status quo 
- are to be applauded, not scrutinized. 15 
15. Before exploring the second problem with Sunstein's account of status quo neutrality, I 
want to take a detour and discuss briefly why Sunstein permits - indeed insists upon - this 
qualification of his basic thesis. Why insist on an exception to the general attack on status quo 
neutrality, the magnitude of which might well swamp the principle? I think there are two possi-
ble answers, one that I endorse, and a second that follows from now-standard forms of critical 
argumentation - put forward by the critical legal studies movement - that is now widely held 
both in and out of CLS but that I think is flawed. Sunstein's book provides a striking example of 
where CLS analysis fails and why we might profitably consider alternatives. 
The first explanation for the Sunsteinian contradiction - and the one that I think is basically 
right - is simply that Sunstein is a lawyer first and a social visionary second. He wants to put 
forward a vision of what this society ought to look like and be, but he also wants to put forward a 
positive, plausible account of the meaning of the Constitution. The glaring inconsistency -
vigorously attack status quo neutrality, but preserve hands-off market capitalism - at the heart 
of the prescriptive or moral dimension of Sunstein's book is first and foremost in the Constitution. 
If the Constitution is itself contradictory in this way, then, to whatever extent the Constitution 
guides and restricts our political options, our political vision will be contradictory as well. For 
Sunstein - as is typically true for constitutional theorists - the Constitution does indeed both 
guide and restrict moral vision. 
On this account, in other words, the contradiction in Sunstein's political vision is a function 
of our contradictory Constitution. What Sunstein has done - which is not uncommon among 
constitutional theorists - is define his normative vision by reference to the best read he can give 
of the Constitution's meaning. Like the liberal constitutional theorists of the 1960s and 1970s, 
Sunstein is unfailingly respectful toward and uncritical of the Constitution. If the Constitution 
demands complacency toward market capitalism but a vigilant critical stance toward all other 
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The second problem with Sunstein's denunciation of status quo 
institutions and traditions of modern life that constitute in some form the "status quo" we in-
herit, then so be it - that contradiction must be somehow desirable as well as constitutionally 
mandatory. Moral vision will be tailored accordingly. 
The second possible explanation for the contradictory attitude toward market capitalism at 
the heart ofSunstein's book is that, entirely aside from constitutional mandates, Sunstein himself 
just happens to be uncritical of capitalism but highly critical of all of our other social institutions 
and the injustices to which they give rise, and that combination of views has skewed his reading 
of the Constitution. His privately held politics, in other words, are driving his interpretation of 
the Constitution, rather than, as postulated above, the clear mandate of the Constitution deter-
mining his political and moral commitments. On this explanation, the Constitution does not 
contain any clause that demands that an exception the size of a mountain be carved into the 
general requirement that we critically assess the status quo, so that maldistributions of wealth go 
untouched. Indeed, quite the contrary. It is easy enough - or at least it is not impossible - to 
read the Takings, Contract, and Due Process Clauses as protective not of existing property rights 
but of what "property rights" might be thought of as symbolically encoding: a general right to a 
healthy standard ofliving. Any halfway decent constitutional lawyer should be able to construct 
the argument. On this account - loosely, the account put forward by the critical legal studies 
movement - it is the preexisting politics of the theorist or interpreter of the Constitution, and 
not the Constitution itself, that contains the fundamental contradiction. The Constitution is not 
internally contradictory. Its meaning is too indeterminate to be either contradictory or consis-
tent. It means what one pours into it, and, if Sunstein finds a general mandate of justification 
that is qualified by complacency toward markets, it is because he has chosen to put it there -
both the general mandate and the qualification. Mark Tushnet, one of the most prominent advo-
cates of the indeterminate Constitution, has written a review of Sunstein's book arguing this 
point. See Mark Tushnet, The Bricoleur at the Center, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1071, 1114-15 (1993) 
(reviewing The Partial Constitution). 
This second explanation follows directly from the central CLS claim that the Constitution 
itself is indeterminate. The most important implication of that claim is that it is always the 
interpreter, not the document, who is responsible for any inconsistencies and for any political 
judgments one might choose to locate in a legal or constitutional - or for that matter any other 
- text. I have written elsewhere why I think this widely held view is wrong. See Robin West, 
Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REv. 765, 788-90 (1992). Let me just note here that w.e 
might profitably examine what I have put forward above as the first of these two explanations in 
a bit more detail - to wit, the possibility that inconsistencies in the moral or political views of 
constitutional theorists might have their genesis in a contradictory Constitution, rather than in 
the preconstitutional contradictory views of the theorist. Id. at 774-80. In this case, in other 
words, we should not rule out the possibility that Sunstein has in effect reported correctly - the 
Constitution really does contain both a general prohibition against status quo neutrality and a 
specific insistence on just that neutrality toward inequalities generated by markets. If the contra-
diction is in the Constitution, rather than in Sunstein's politics, we should know it. Our present 
Constitution might be just as contradictory in its stance toward market-generated poverty as the 
original Constitution was in its stance toward slavery. If so, then it contains just as serious a 
flaw. Obsessive attention paid to the alternative explanatory account - that contradiction in an 
interpretation of a document is invariably a function of the interpreter's contradictory politics 
because the document itself has no determinate meaning, contradictory or otherwise - may be 
simply distracting us from a more critical, and urgently needed, appraisal of the moral and con-
ceptual failings of the Constitution itself. 
Generally, what I want to urge is that, the claims of the critical scholars notwithstanding, it 
may be that a flawed and contradictory Constitution has rendered inconsistent and compromised 
the moral vision of some of our most influential, as well as most constitutionally influenced, 
social theoreticians - rather than the other way around. The ability of constitutional theorists -
and to a lesser extent the rest of us - to see clearly that to which this society should aspire may 
be stunted and compromised, not inspired, by what the Constitution has to teach if the Constitu-
tion is itself stunted and compromised and if we insist on couching our social aspirations in the 
language of the Constitution. In other words, when we put forth claims as to what this society 
ought to look like and simultaneously put forth claims as to what the Constitution requires, and 
simultaneously claim that they are one and the same - that what we ought to be is precisely 
what the Constitution claims we must be - the result may be not just a disingenuous reading of 
the Constitution to fit our preexisting political aspirations - although it may of course be that -
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neutrality comes from the other end of the political spectrum. The 
tone and content of this book illustrate precisely what it is about the 
rationalist enlightenment sensibility that drove Edmund Burke to his 
masterful denunciation of the Age of Reason, 16 and well exemplify 
precisely those qualities about reform-minded liberalism that drive 
Burke's contemporary followers to fits of distraction.17 Must we really 
justify the status quo every minute of our waking lives? This will be a 
busy government indeed. Should we allow this house to continue 
standing or this tree to continue growing? Do we not have to weigh 
their value against alternative uses for the land upon which they sit? 
Can we really justify public subsidies to the arts, in light of today's 
needs? What about tomorrow's needs? Should we not collectively and 
rationally, rather than individually and whimsically, decide the best 
allocation of the considerable resources represented by private for-
tunes, handed down in violation of every conceivable scheme of justice 
from one wealthy ingrate to the next, generation after undeserving 
generation? Perhaps, today, interest in stability and the diversity and 
liberty that "markets" allow to flourish might justify the continuing 
existence of my house, the tree outside, subsidies for the arts, or inheri-
tance entitlements, but, then again, they might not - and there is no 
justification whatsoever for cutting off the inquiry. There is more than 
a little hubris and a great deal of bureaucratic confidence smuggled 
into the innocent-sounding claim that the status quo, no less than de-
partures from it, stands in constant need of justification. 
C. The Republic of Reason 
The third philosophical premise behind the Sunsteinian Constitu-
tion is that reason and deliberation - not power, nature, preferences, 
or interests - are at the heart of democracy as conceived by the U.S. 
Constitution (pp. 1-14, 17-39). Indeed, Sunstein tells us, this under-
standing of democracy constitutes the uniquely American contribution 
to the world's shared understanding of the nature of sovereignty (pp. 
18-24). We are, by constitutional mandate, a republic of reasons. 
Only reasons can justify political actions. Nature does not justify so-
cial practice or legal mandate (pp. 18-19); nor do preferences (pp. 162-
94), interests (pp. 24-25), or power (pp. 18-20). According to Sun-
stein, while the Constitution may be equivocal concerning the value of 
status quo neutrality, it is absolutely unequivocal in its advocacy of 
but rather, more disturbingly, a stunted vision of what we ought to be - stunted in order to fit 
the compromises, inconsistencies, and morally fatal qualifications of a profoundly flawed and 
seriously "partial" constitution. Constitutional theorists are peculiarly vulnerable to precisely 
this form of moral compromise. 
16. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Thomas H. D. 
Mahoney ed., 1976) (1790). 
17. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); Anthony T. Kronman, 
Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990). 
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reason. The primacy of reason is the common thread that ties to-
gether the revolutionaries' overthrow of the English monarchy (pp. 
18-19), the constitutionalists' simultaneous embrace of both civic re-
publicanism and factional pluralism (pp. 20-22), the Reconstruction-
ists' repudiation of slavery and constitutive institutions (p. 136), and 
the New Deal crafters' reconstitution of the very meaning of natural 
entitlements (pp. 51-61). In all of these cases -in all of these consti-
tutional moments - the Constitution came to reflect a disapproval of 
nonrational or irrational forms of political authority - whether based 
on monarchical status, interest group, racial category, or economic 
class. Again, the shared lesson is simply that only reason - not 
bloodline, race, class, power, interest, or preferences - can justify the 
exercise of power. 
There are two problems in Sunstein's analysis. One is the same 
problem noted in a different context above1s - if Sunstein is serious 
about this commitment to reason and deliberation, it is not clear why 
he is so willing to tolerate - even applaud - the profoundly irra-
tional hierarchic relationships of entitlement and disenfranchisement 
generated by gross inequalities of wealth. Second, the entire argument 
has an odd and paradoxical ring to it: Sunstein is using an authorita-
tive text and an authoritative tradition to argue for an anti-
authoritarian form of government. Thus, it is as though he is saying, 
"You cannot rely on mere authority to justify your actions because 
authority says you cannot." His own reverential stance toward the 
Constitution, in other words, mirrors almost precisely the reverential 
attitude toward monarchy that he insists the constitutionalists as well 
as the revolutionaries so adamantly opposed. The antiauthoritarian-
ism, the rationalism, the spirit of enlightenment, the ever-critical 
stance toward authority, power, interests, factions, nature, and all else 
but reason, which he finds implicit and explicit in the text of the Con-
stitution, undermine, more than anything else possibly could, the case 
for treating that Constitution, along with its mandate of anti-
authoritarianism, as authority for anything. If the Constitution tells 
us not to take authority seriously, then why should we take the Consti-
tution seriously, as well as its mandate of antiauthoritarianism? 
I do not mean simply to introduce a brain teaser. It seems to me 
there are two different ways one might approach a constitution - the 
very idea of a constitution - and still hold fast to the rationalist ideals 
of the Enlightenment, and both are riddled with problems. One is to 
regard the Constitution as a definitive statement of substantive ideals, 
proven to be worthy of respect over time, and to defer to the authority 
of the Constitution accordingly. One then has a reason, grounded in 
reason, for taking constitutional authority seriously, importantly in-
cluding its substantive commands and not just its antiauthoritarian 
18. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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core. The second is to regard the Constitution as a definitive rejection 
of irrational authority - a sort of imperfect and at times clumsily 
worded commitment to the ideal of reasoned authority. Then one has 
a reason, grounded in both reason and the authority of the Constitu-
tion, for not taking the substantive commands of the Constitution too 
seriously - after all, the most central message is its antiauthoritarian-
ism, not its substantive mandates. Both of these routes, I think, are 
problematic in obvious ways, but what is even more problematic, per-
haps even impossible, is to hold open both of these possibilities simul-
taneously. That, though, is precisely what Sunstein has tried to do. 
What results from that attempt is an oddly unjustified deference to 
constitutional authority - the oddity of which is underscored, rather 
than ameliorated, by Sunstein's insistence that the authoritative com-
mand of that document is profoundly antiauthoritarian. 
D. The Anticaste Principle 
The fourth and final substantive premise of Sunstein's constitution-
alism is a conception of equality, and hence of equal protection: What 
the Fourteenth Amendment dictates is that government not tum a 
morally insignificant characteristic, such as race or sex,· into the basis 
of systemic disadvantage (pp. 338-45). On the basis of the anticaste 
principle, Sunstein argues for a number of positions pertaining to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, ranging from the permissibility of affirmative 
action (pp. 77-79, 149-50, 156-57, 331-32) to the unconstitutionality of 
constraints on abortion (pp. 270-85). Again, I do not intend to reiter-
ate those particular arguments in this review. Instead I want to note 
two problematic features of the anticaste principle itself. 
The first tracks the central problem of this book, which I have 
already noted:19 Sunstein's refusal to think through the implications 
of his anticaste principle for impoverished people (pp. 341-42). Surely 
there can be no clearer "systemic disadvantage" than poverty, no 
more irrelevant characteristic than the economic well being of the 
family into which one is born, and consequently no greater injustice 
than the creation and maintenance of a permanent underclass. If so, 
then it is the greatest violation of the Constitution of our day. Yet 
Sunstein assures the reader again and again that he does not intend his 
anticaste principle to extend this far, for the flatly stated reason that to 
do so would unduly compromise the liberatory virtues of markets (pp. 
341-42). 
Again, it is simply, tremendously disappointing that there is in the 
end no detailed discussion of the support for this position. An anti-
caste principle seems like a promising bridge between the clear intent 
of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment and the lives of relative 
servitude endured by members of the permanent underclass. If one 
19. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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can sustain the claim that a resistance to caste is the principle behind 
the words of the Fourteenth Amendment, then there is a compelling 
argument indeed for the proposition that there are constitutional limi-
tations, emanating from the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, to the gross disparities of wealth characteristic of 
modem American life. It is extremely unfortunate, as well as simply 
revealing of the state of our current politics, that this book does not 
make that argument. 
The second problem is related: The anticaste principle is simply 
too demanding if taken too literally, and, consequently, because it 
truly cannot be taken literally, its application is unpredictable and ar-
bitrary - it is invoked when a conclusion reached on some other 
grounds demands a neutral-sounding justification. There are two rea-
sons for this indeterminacy: first, there are no differences between 
people that are "morally irrelevant" in the abstract; second, and even 
more clearly, there is no noncontroversial content one can possibly 
give to the notion of "systemic disadvantage." To take the latter, most 
obvious point first, it is not clear, as Sunstein seems to think it is, when 
someone is systematically disadvantaged by a condition or what the 
consequence of that disadvantage should be. For example, it is cer-
tainly not clear to me that whites are not "systematically disadvan-
taged" by affirmative action. It is even less clear that, if they are, that 
systematic disadvantage is unjust or unconstitutional .. Surely one 
could plausibly argue that whites are indeed systematically disadvan-
taged by affirmative action, but that such a disadvantage, given the 
context, is simply not unjust. Difficult issues, and affirmative action is 
one, are not resolved by invocation of slogans. 
Further, there is no abstract category easily labeled "morally irrel-
evant differences." Differences are only relevant or irrelevant to some 
particular decision made in the context of some particular ongoing 
relationship. Thus, distinctions which would most assuredly be mor-
ally irrelevant to distributions made by government are precisely the 
distinctions upon which we rely, as private citizens, every day. We 
systemically prefer our family members to nonmembers, members of 
our community to distant strangers, and even citizens to noncitizens, 
and these practices seem not only morally unobjectionable but in some 
ways morally compelled. Morality seems, if anything, to be more a 
function of these relationships, all of which in some way involve indi-
viduals thrown together because of some morally "irrelevant" history 
into a relationship that converts that irrelevancy into the very founda-
tion of moral obligation. The morality that guides our practice, 
whatever may be the state of our theory, seems far more closely con-
nected to these relationships than to any categorical imperative of 
neutrality. 
Obviously, what may be "morally relevant" to a decision made by 
a private individual might be quite different from what is or is not 
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morally relevant to a government decision; that an individual parent 
might be permissibly "biased" toward her children on the basis of the 
irrelevant characteristic of a genetic or adoptive connection should not 
count against the moral impropriety of a legislator being so inclined. 
It might be acceptable for me as a parent to prefer my own children to 
my neighbor's, but not for me to do so when acting as a legislator; the 
distinction between my children and other children, from the legisla-
tive perspective, is indeed in some sense morally irrelevant. However, 
if "morally irrelevant distinction" simply means a distinction upon 
which government should not rely, then the anticaste principle turns 
out to be completely empty; all it states is that government should not 
turn those differences which government should not use into the bases 
for systemic disadvantage. This is not going to be a very helpful 
principle. 
The problem, though, might be not with the "anticaste" principle, 
but rather, more broadly, with the idea of invoking a principle of any 
sort to resolve hard moral and constitutional questions. To sustain the 
claim that Jim Crow segregation is wrong but affirmative action is 
good, or that constraints on abortion are bad and that reproductive 
rights are good, we need more than a slogan. After forty years of 
formulating, reformulating, and rejecting principles with which to re-
solve issues of racial justice, it is becoming harder and harder to see 
precisely what any of these principles - whether the principle of col-
orblindness, or anticaste, or antisubordination, or antidiscrimination 
- are doing, beyond providing fancy rhetorical garb for slogans. If 
the past four decades of arguing over which principles should be in-
voked, and how, to resolve hard cases of racial justice have taught us 
anything at all, it surely is that principles - particularly when shed of 
context - simply do not decide hard cases. 
E. Conclusion: The Role of Reason 
By way of conclusion I want to comment briefly, critically, and 
entirely impressionistically on what I have suggested above is the im-
plicit methodological claim of this book: to wit, that through the exer-
cise of reason - rather than passion, emotion, or of course force - we 
will reach consensus on divisive moral issues. I think that is wrong -
reason alone will not lead us to consensus - but that is not the point I 
want to urge here. All I want to note is that Sunstein's apparent em-
brace of this conviction - that reasoned deliberation is the method of 
moral inquiry - for all its nobility, hampers the presentation of argu-
ments in this book. Simply put, this book lays stake to reason but 
lacks heart, and, given his thesis, this matters. Sunstein wants us to 
reorient our thinking about the Constitution in an extremely funda-
mental way; he wants us to view it as a mandate to challenge rather 
than to conserve the status quo. What he has not done is show us why 
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we should. He does tell us we should change the status quo when and 
where it is unjust. But he does not demonstrate the injustice. 
Let me put the point a slightly different way. It is hard to squelch 
the feeling, as one reads through the awesome array of arguments 
presented in this book, that something central has been left out of each 
and every one; the moral case for the various positions for which Sun-
stein marshals his legal arguments is somehow missing. The argu-
ments for regulating pornography, for deregulating abortion, for 
controlling campaign financing, for regulating some hate speech, for 
regulating surrogacy contracts, for weak protection of welfare rights, 
and all the rest of it, are often intellectually convincing. When I read 
through this book, however, I could not shake the feeling that I simply 
did not have a clue why Sunstein chose this particular collection of 
positions to defend. Is it really the case that Sunstein supports legal 
abortion - which he fervently does - because he believes that its 
legal prohibition would be unconstitutional? Frankly, that is rather 
bloodless. Alternatively, one would hope, Sunstein opposes the 
criminalization or recriminalization of abortion because he thinks wo-
men must have this right in order to lead decent lives, and, given our 
current legal status, one way to ensure that they will is to deploy con-
stitutional authority against attempts to control them. If this latter 
account is right, nothing in this book tells you why women need the 
right, and that is the sense in which the case is simply missing. Sug-
gestions are made - the most important one being that criminalizing 
abortion is wrong because such regulations have the effect of turning 
women's reproductive capa,cities into a tool for the use of others (pp. 
270- 85). Because these regulations do so, they violate the anticaste 
principle. Because they violate the anticaste principle, they violate the 
Equal Protection Clause and are accordingly unconstitutional. But, if 
we take this argument at face value, the reason it is even noteworthy 
that regulations on abortion have the pernicious effect they have on 
women's lives is that this fact is ·a necessary step in the argument for 
their unconstitutionality. The focus, the goal line, and, one fears, the 
passion is for constitutional purity, rather than for women's lives. 
Heaven forbid we should have bad constitutional law on the books, 
and a decision overruling Roe v. Wade would indeed be bad law. 
Again, to be blunt, that looks more like constitutional fetishism than 
like feminism. 
The same can be said of most - though not quite all - of the 
arguments in this book. Tellingly, Sunstein begins his argument for 
the constitutionality of regulating pornography with only a cursory 
account of the harms pornography visits upon women (pp. 265-66). 
He then moves on to what is the heart of the discussion - that oppo-
nents of these regulations base their opposition on a false belief in the 
naturalness of the status quo (pp. 261-70). The discussion does not 
satisfy, in part because it is not at all clear that opponents of anti-
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pornography regulations have the quaint and silly set of beliefs he at-
tributes to them,20 but more fundamentally, I think, because he has 
not carried the burden he surely must: to show the reader why por-
nography is hurtful. What we are left with is a shell of an argument, 
ready for use by anyone willing to supply the core. The shell of the 
argument does not ultimately convince. In fact, it does not come 
close. 
Cass Sunstein is a committed feminist, and a committed humanist, 
and a fervent democrat. He cares deeply about women's lives. That is 
why he cares about pornography. He also cares about children, and 
that is why he cares about the junk on television that passes for chil-
dren's programming. He is also a democrat who cares about the qual-
ity of our public life, and that is why he cares about limits on 
campaign spending. What is odd is that you would never know any of 
this from his writing. The tone of the writing instead suggests a 
scholar who cares deeply about the Constitution and who happens to 
think that a number of modem arguments currently being advocated 
by feminists that would happen to benefit women - and some argu-
ments by television critics and would-be regulators on behalf of regula-
tions that would happen to benefit children, and some arguments by 
democrats regarding campaign spending that would happen to im-
prove the quality of public life - are probably, as a constitutional 
matter, quite right. The commitment to the Constitution, in other 
words, is primary. That it aligns with some feminist or democratic 
politics - or that it would incidentally benefit women, children, or 
democracy - is quite incidental. 
I think that the tone does not fit the man and the cause of the ill fit 
is an excessive commitment to rationalism. Reason alone will wrinkle 
out inconsistencies in our convictions, and the critical use of reason 
will expose inconsistencies in the views of others. But reason will not 
account for, or in the end meaningfully challenge, our rock-bottom 
moral beliefs, and Sunstein is simply wrong to think otherwise. The 
exercise of reason, and the pursuit of rational deliberation which is its 
behavioral and political counterpart, will not lead us to agreement. 
Reason will supply the shell but never the core of moral arguments, 
and hence of constitutional arguments as well, if we insist on incorpo-
rating our moral commitments into our constitutional interpretations. 
The core of our moral beliefs is constituted, not by reason, but by 
our experiences and by our empathic sense of the experiences of 
20. Thus, Sunstein asserts that the anticensorship position "[i]n some of its incarnations ••• 
has relatively straightforward nee-Freudian roots. It rests on the perceived naturalness of sexual 
drives, and it emphasizes the need to liberate those drives from the constraining arm of the 
state. . . . The link between [the traditional antiobscenity and anticensorship] positions lies in 
their shared reliance on a private sphere of sexuality, taken as natural and in any case as neutral 
and just" (pp. 262-63). Sunstein does not provide any support for this atribution ofneo-Freudian 
naturalism to opponents of censorship. I am not at all sure who he means to include in this 
description. 
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others. This is a hard truth to acknowledge. It inescapably implies 
that reason alone is not going to compel agreement. All of the 
sentences in Sunstein's book that label an argument right or wrong 
would be in need of serious revision. Most critically, the certainty 
with which he writes that rational readers who accept his premises will 
move steadily along with him to his conclusions would fall away. We 
have had different experiences. We see the world differently. These 
facts must be addressed and acknowledged, and, if we are really aim-
ing for genuine consensus, the experiential gaps must be bridged. Sun-
stein does not even attempt it. 
Let me try to illustrate the problem I want to highlight with an 
example. Sunstein is firmly committed to women's reproductive free-
dom. The question is why. Again, what he says on this score is not 
exactly enlightening. He does say, of course, that abortion restrictions 
tum women's reproductive lives into a tool for the use of others (pp. 
272-73), but, again, he makes that assertion in the course of presenting 
an argument for their unconstitutionality, not as an explanation of 
why they are a bad thing. I have never been sure - and after reading 
this book I am still not sure - why Cass Sunstein is so fervently 
prochoice. 
I do know why I am, and it most assuredly has nothing to do with 
reason or principle. I saw a picture many years ago, and again more 
recently, and I was vividly reminded of it while reading Sunstein's 
book. I am not sure where I first saw it, but the picture has been 
reprinted in the most recent edition of Our Bodies, Ourselves. 21 The 
picture is a black and white photograph of a naked woman crouched 
down on a tile floor. She is alone, except for the photographer. The 
picture is shot from the rear. Her head is resting cheek-down on the 
floor. She is young, and one might first think, or hope, for only a 
second, that she is sleeping. But - the eye is drawn down, and there 
is a pool of blood under her. The blood suggests, and the caption 
confirms, that she is dead. 
This picture has haunted me for years. I never knew anyone who 
died of an illegal abortion. But, when I saw that picture, I was filled 
with sadness and then with an overpowering feeling of identity. What 
a terrible, lonely, torturous, painful, fearful, and unutterably sad way 
to die. It is, to my mind, indistinguishable from torture. It could so 
easily, so very very easily, have been me, have been anyone and every-
one that I knew. Partly because I so readily recall the impact of this 
picture, I teach the well-known brief, authored by the National Abor-
tion Rights Action League (NARAL), and colloquially known as the 
"Voices Brief,"22 every year in a feminist legal theory seminar and in a 
21. BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK CoLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES 
372 (2d ed. 1992). 
22. Brief of Amici Curiae National Abortion Rights Action League et al., Thornburgh v. 
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law and literature seminar as well. In the Voices Brief, now routinely 
submitted by NARAL as an amicus brief in all major abortion cases, 
the NARAL lawyers put together a document consisting primarily of 
women's stories of abortion - legal and illegal - and of their reasons 
for having one and its effect on their lives. Some of those stories, like 
the picture described above, are quite harrowing. Every year at least 
one student, usually a man, tells me that the brief changed his mind on 
abortion. It seems to me that the picture from Our Bodies, Ourselves, 
like the NARAL brief, does something that Sunstein's book simply 
does not even attempt: it shows - illustrates - the terrible conse-
quences of rolling back Roe v. Wade. Obviously, one does not have to 
have been there to understand what those consequences might be. 
However, one must indeed somehow be shown those consequences. 
The consequence that matters is that, in a world of illegal abortion, 
some of us, but only some of us, live out a regime of terror, torture, 
and unnecessary death. This is not a hard point to grasp. But, to be 
grasped, it must be shown. Principles and reason do not make the 
case. 
My point is simply that moral convictions are changed experien-
tially or empathically, not through argument. Given a moral convic-
tion that the criminal prohibition of abortion would be a terrible 
wrong, any number of constitutional arguments suggest themselves. 
One might argue, for example, that no one should suffer a torturous 
death at a young age at the hands of criminal entrepreneurs. We 
should be protected - we should be "equally protected" - against 
this form of butchery. If the way to achieve that protection is through 
legalization of abortion, then so be it. The alternative is that women 
- women you know - will surely die, and, when and if they do, the 
state would most assuredly have failed to provide them equal protec-
tion of the law. 
In a cataloging of facts intended to show that, contrary to the 
claims of prolife advocates, criminalizing abortion will not reduce fetal 
death at all but will only increase maternal death - the legality or 
illegality of abortion affects only the safety, not the frequency, of abor-
tions - Sunstein notes that during the heyday of criminalization five 
to ten thousand women a year died of illegal abortions (p. 278). Five 
to ten thousand - dead. It was when I read that paragraph that I 
recalled the woman in the picture. If the Constitution is the recorda-
tion of the ideal ways in which we aim to constitute ourselves, then 
that fact alone - five to ten thousand dead - is surely of constitu-
tional significance. 
By taking Sunstein to task for not providing the experiential and 
emotional "core" of his moral arguments, I am not advocating illogic 
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495 & 84-
1379), reprinted in 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 3 (1986). 
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or irrationality. What I am seeking to highlight is that injustice must 
be shown, not asserted. Sunstein clearly believes, and strongly, that 
the status quo - the way things are - is in need of justification. He 
clearly believes that the status quo is rife with injustice. If he did not 
think that, then surely he would not have gone to the immense trouble 
to craft a constitutional vision designed to highlight that fact. What 
he has not shown, however, is the injustice. What of the world has he 
seen that leads him to the conclusion that we must challenge the world 
we have inherited? His deeply held belief that we must indeed change 
our unjust world is a moral conviction that matters. If he wants us to 
reorient our view of the Constitution because of it, he has to move us 
to the point where we share it. Reason alone simply will not move us 
- but experience, empathy, and reflection might. 
This is a strong book. Cass Sunstein has convincingly shown that 
we could reorient our thinking about the Constitution without doing 
undue violence to our basic institutions or to our constitutional his-
tory. But if he had done more - if he had tried to show us why we 
should reorient our thinking, if he had made even a nod in that direc-
tion - an already strong case for radical constitutional change might 
have been a more compelling one. 
